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I.   INTRODUCTION 
The existing literature and regulatory practice is divided on whether intense competition in the 
banking sector contributes to its stability or leads to the buildup of vulnerabilities. Some 
theoretical studies argue that competition erodes profits and tends to motivate banks to embark 
upon risky investments (Smith, 1984). Others take a diametrically opposite view and argue that 
banks in uncompetitive, monopolistic markets with intermediate monitoring costs are prone to 
originate risky loans that set the stage for subsequent problems in the system (Caminal and 
Matutes, 2002).  
Due to the absence of sufficiently large datasets on financial institutions’ competitive behaviors, 
hardly any empirical research has so far been dedicated to this subject in a cross-country setting. 
Consequently, many researchers and policymakers have drawn heavily upon bank concentration 
as a proxy for competition. However, others argue that concentration is an inappropriate 
measure to gauge the degree of competition. For example, Claessens and Laeven (2004) find no 
supportive empirical evidence for the intuitively anticipated inverse relationship between 
concentration and competition.2 Moreover, relying on concentration as a measure of bank 
competition gives rise to misleading inferences and measurement problems since concentration 
measures such as the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and the k bank concentration ratio tend to 
exaggerate the level of competition in small countries and are increasingly unreliable when the 
number of banks is small (Bikker, 2004). While the recent literature differentiates between 
competition and concentration (Berger and others, 2004), none of these studies specifically tests 
for the relationship between competitive conduct of financial institutions and its implications for 
systemic risk. 
In this paper, we analyze empirically the effect of competitive conduct of financial institutions 
on banking system fragility in a cross-country setting. Our aim is to address the important 
questions of whether competitive bank behavior decreases banking system fragility and how the 
regulatory environment impacts upon the likelihood and timing of systemic banking problems.  
Our research contributes to the literature in four ways. First, using data on 38 countries over the 
period 1980–2003, we provide the first cross-country investigation of the implications of 
competitive bank conduct, as measured by the Panzar and Rosse (1987) H-Statistic, on banking 
fragility. This method is considered superior to previously used proxies for the degree of 
competition since it describes competitive behavior of financial institutions using comparative 
static properties of reduced-form revenue equations based on cross-sectional data. Moreover, 
the H-Statistic also captures competitive behavior of other market participants and is therefore a 
measure of direct competitive conduct. Second, we introduce a methodological advancement in 
the literature on financial fragility by estimating parametric duration models with time-varying 
covariates to examine the timing of systemic banking crises, controlling for the institutional and 
regulatory setting. While several studies employ discrete choice models based on logit and 
                                                 
2 Claessens and Laeven (2004) also refer to evidence in the industrial organization literature that underscores that 
measures of market structure such as the number of institutions and concentration ratios are not necessarily related 
to the level of competitiveness in an industry. 
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probit analysis (Eichengreen and Arteta, 2000; Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998, 2005) 
that compute the probability of observing a crisis at some unspecified point in time, the duration 
model offers an additional advantage in that it yields estimates for the time until a crisis is 
observed. Moreover, using time-varying covariates in the duration model accurately accounts 
for multiple observations per country and can be considered to be more appropriate for the panel 
structure of our data set than commonly utilized discrete choice models where the estimation is 
run for a pooled sample. We consider these two modeling techniques to be complementary and 
believe an evaluation of the hypotheses with two different estimation procedures sheds more 
light on the relationship between competition and crises than using only one technique on its 
own. Third, our analysis helps to further disentangle the relationship between competition and 
concentration by simultaneously incorporating explanatory variables that proxy both 
competitive bank conduct and concentration. Previous studies provide evidence for a significant 
bearing of the level of concentration on the probability of observing systemic crises without 
controlling for competition. Our research reinvestigates the concentration-fragility nexus and 
explores whether concentration and competition measure different characteristics of banking 
systems. Fourth, independently of the investigation of the relationship between competition, 
fragility, and the timing of systemic crises, we analyze the extent to which the regulatory setting 
impacts the timing of systemic crises. Incorporating regulatory variables not only provides an 
additional robustness check for the relationship between competition and fragility, but also 
sheds light on the impact of the regulatory environment on banking system soundness. 
 
Our findings suggest that competitive behavior of financial institutions, as measured by the 
Panzar and Rosse (1987) H-Statistic, not only significantly decreases the probability of systemic 
banking problems but also increases the survival time of banking systems. We view our results 
as initial empirical substantiation of the “competition–stability” view in the theoretical 
literature. The results for the probability of experiencing a systemic crisis and for time to crisis 
hold when the level of concentration in the banking system is controlled for, and are robust to a 
set of tests involving: (i) alternative samples, (ii) different sampling periods, (iii) first 
differences rather than levels for the macroeconomic control variables; and (iv) and fitting a 
control variable that captures competition from financial markets more directly. Our core result 
for the positive effect of competitive conduct in banking systems is also widely robust to 
controlling for a set of institutional and regulatory variables, which furthermore confirms the 
evidence indicative for the “competition–stability” view. We find no empirical support for the 
“competition–fragility” view, i.e. the view that more competitive systems are more fragile.  
 
The virtual absence of empirical work in a cross-country setting on the relationship between 
competitive conduct of financial institutions and fragility necessitates that we qualify our 
results. First, the measure of competitiveness, the Panzar and Rosse (1987) H-Statistic gauges 
competition by examining marginal bank behavior in 1994–2001. Thus, competitive behavior is 
measured in some instances after a crisis surfaced. We therefore utilize different sampling 
periods and different sample coverage but the results reiterate our finding that more competition 
is correlated with more banking system stability. Clearly, future research is necessary to shed 
more light on this relationship. Second, caution has to be exercised when interpreting the results 
on the findings obtained in the regressions that control for the regulatory environment. This 
information has been collected toward the end of the sampling period. However, this only 
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mildly affects the outcome of the H-Statistic on fragility as we obtain largely identical results 
when excluding regulatory variables. Third, the dating scheme for banking crises is important. 
We therefore utilize an updated version of the widely employed root source for the 
classification of systemic banking problems provided by Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 
(2005). Fourth, the analysis presented here does not allow making firm conclusions on 
causality, i.e., whether competition increases stability or vice versa; we therefore abstain from 
interpreting the results in a causal sense. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We review the relevant literature on the 
links between competition, concentration, and fragility in Section II. A detailed exposition of 
the methodology, including the Panzar and Rosse (1987) H-Statistic and the parametric duration 
models with time varying covariates is presented in Section III. Section IV provides an 
overview on the data set and summary statistics. We report the results and a variety of 
robustness tests in Section V. Section VI offers concluding remarks.  
 
II.   LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Our review of related studies on the question of competition versus stability draws from several 
strands in the literature. We first focus on the link between competition and concentration. 
Second, we review studies on concentration and stability. Third, we discuss theoretical and 
empirical studies on the relationship between competition and stability. The final section briefly 
surveys the literature on the implications of the regulatory and institutional environment for 
financial system soundness.  
 
A.   Competition and Concentration 
 
The literature is short on the direct relationship between competitive conduct of financial 
institutions and its bearing for concentration.3 This is surprising, given that issues of 
competition and concentration in the banking industry are heavily debated by policymakers. 
Bikker (2004) underscores that concentration may have an impact on competition and that 
increasing the size of financial firms has substantial bearing for financial stability. Following an 
approach pursued in the industrial organization literature, he proposes that competition can be 
measured by the Panzar and Rosse (1987) H-Statistic. This statistic is a way to capture 
competitive behavior of financial institutions to examine empirically if the efficiency of larger 
                                                 
3 We constrain our review to the key studies that focus on the direct link between measures of competition and 
concentration. A variety of other studies on the relationship between concentration and competition in a wider 
sense exists and is reviewed in detail by Berger and others (2004). For example, Berger and Hannan (1989) and 
Neumark and Sharpe (1992) examine the effect of concentration on the pricing of banking services, whereas Berger 
(1995) and Frame and Kamerschen (1997) consider concentration to be a function of scale and X-efficiencies. 
DeYoung, Hunter, and Udell (2004) and Berger and Udell (2002), among others, discuss the role of different types 
and sizes of institutions for their competitive conduct. The ownership–competition nexus is explored in depth by 
DeYoung and Nolle (1996), Berger and others (2000), and Berger, Hasan, and Klapper (2004). Petersen and Rajan 
(1995) review the consequences of competition and concentration for credit availability and economic growth and 
empirical work on this link is presented by, among others, Jayaratne and Strahan (1996, 1998), Cetorelli (2003), 
and Berger, Hasan, and Klapper (2004).   
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banks drives superior performance. To test the effect of concentration on competition, Bikker 
and Haaf (2002) regress the H-Statistic on a variety of concentration indices and the number of 
banks in a sample of 23 industrialized countries and find that increasing concentration 
significantly decreases competition across a number of different model specifications. Contrary 
to these results, drawing upon a sample of 50 countries, Claessens and Laeven (2004) use four 
different models to compute the H-Statistic and report that their analysis provides empirical 
support for a positive association of concentration and competition. Their findings are robust to 
the incorporation of regulatory variables that capture the contestability of the banking systems 
in the countries under consideration. Claessens and Laeven (2004) conclude that the degree of 
concentration may be a poor indicator for the competitive environment in which banks operate.  
 
Thus, the case for using concentration as a proxy for competition can be seriously disputed. This 
is critical for the inference of policy implications since concentration does not necessarily imply 
the lack of competition, given that factors other than competition may drive concentration. For 
instance, regulatory initiatives to increase capital may spark off a wave of mergers that 
considerably increases the level of concentration in the industry. Moreover, a banking system 
with high entry barriers, in which a small number of institutions dominate the industry, can 
nevertheless be characterized by competition.  
 
B.   Concentration and Stability 
 
Two distinct strands in the literature reflect contrasting views on the relationship between 
concentration and stability. In theoretical models, Allen and Gale (2000, 2004) exemplify that 
financial crises are more likely to occur in less concentrated banking systems. This is due to the 
absence of powerful providers of financial products that can reap benefits from high profits that 
serve as a cushion against asset deterioration. A similar view is taken by Boot and Greenbaum 
(1993) who highlight that increasing bank charter values arising from increased market power 
create incentives for bank managers to act prudently thereby contributing to higher bank asset 
quality. These institutions are also considered to be easier to monitor from a regulatory 
perspective.  
 
These theoretical studies have been substantiated by empirical work. Paroush (1995) argues that 
increases in market power arising from diversification benefits of bank mergers suggest higher 
bank stability. Benston, Hunter, and Wall (1995) also investigate bank mergers in the United 
States and report that pre-merger variance of target bank earnings and the pre-merger 
covariance between target and acquiring bank earnings show a negative association with bid 
prices, thereby underlining the hypothesis that increases in market power contribute to financial 
stability. Similar results for mergers of U.S. banks are obtained by Craig and Santos (1997), 
who analyze post-merger profitability and post-merger risk. Recent work by Beck, Demirgüc-
Kunt, and Levine (2005a, 2005b) using a cross-country data set on 69 jurisdictions provides 
strong empirical evidence that is consistent with the “concentration–stability“ view. They report 
that increases in national bank concentration do not feed into increased fragility of the banking 
system and that the results are robust subject to a broad array of robustness tests. In addition, 
they show that less contestable markets, approximated by a set of regulatory variables such as 
activity restrictions for banks, are more prone to experience episodes of systemic crises. 
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However, while this study provides suggestive evidence that regulatory policies that impede 
competition are undesirable from a financial stability viewpoint, the study falls short in 
presenting evidence for the effect of financial institutions’ competitive behavior on banking 
system stability. An analysis of the underlying mechanisms substantiates that concentration 
cannot be considered as a proxy for less competition as their results hold when controlling for 
institutional and regulatory variables supportive of contestable markets (Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt, 
and Levine, 2005b).  
 
Contrary to this “concentration-stability” view, Boyd and de Nicolo (forthcoming) illustrate in a 
theoretical model that powerful institutions’ ability to charge higher interest rates encourages 
risk taking behavior such that increased concentration eventually gives rise to greater 
vulnerabilities. Mishkin (1999), holding a similar view, suggests that banking systems with a 
limited number of large institutions are more likely to be subject to regulators’ “too important to 
fail” policies that encourage risk taking behavior of banks.  
 
Research by de Nicoló and Kwast (2002) scrutinizes the correlation between Large and 
Complex U.S. Banking Organizations (LCBOs) to draw inferences about correlated exposures 
and hence the presence of systemic risk. The authors detect increasing return correlations during 
the sampling period 1988–99 and interpret this as a sign for increased systemic risk. This view 
is subsequently substantiated by de Nicoló and others (2004). Using an alternative measure for 
systemic risk, an aggregate Z-index that gauges the joint probability of failure of the five largest 
banking firms in a country for the period 1993–2000 and drawing upon a cross-country data set, 
the study presents evidence for a positive relationship between concentration and banking 
system fragility. Boyd and Graham (1991, 1996) also provide weak support for this view by 
examining failures of large financial institutions in the United States and test whether large 
banks fail more frequently than smaller institutions. They report that large banks failed more 
often than smaller banks over the entire sampling period of 1971–94. However, splitting the 
sample in different sub-samples gives rise to a more mixed picture such that it becomes difficult 
to establish firm conclusions. 
 
C.   Competition and Stability 
 
In a similar vein to the studies on concentration and fragility where the two conflicting views 
hold that concentration either increases stability or decreases stability, we observe a similar 
pattern in the literature on competition and stability. Carletti and Hartmann (2003) provide an 
in-depth survey and assessment of this literature.  
 
Matutes and Vives (1996) argue that instabilities can arise in any kind of market structure as 
depositors’ propensity to run is determined exogenously by their expectations in the sprit of the 
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model. In contrast, Smith (1984) puts forward a theoretical 
exposition of how increasing competition for bank deposits gives rise to vulnerabilities in the 
system. Besanko and Thakor (1993) illustrate that banks decide on risky portfolio strategies 
when competition stiffens. Taking the design of deposit insurance schemes into consideration, 
Cordella and Yeyati (1998) show that risk-based deposit insurance restrains risk-taking behavior 
of financial institutions even in the presence of increased competition, whereas fierce 
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competition in an environment with flat fee deposit insurance translates into higher risk in the 
system. Similarly, Matutes and Vives (2000) also investigate bank risk taking behavior and 
deposit insurance. They additionally consider social costs associated with bank failures and find 
that excessive competition gives rise to maximal bank risk in the absence of risk-based deposit 
insurance. Likewise, Hellman, Mudroch, and Stiglitz (2000) contemplate that accelerating 
competition makes financial institutions embark upon riskier investments but that capital 
requirements and deposit rate ceilings can help restore prudent bank behavior.  
 
With exception of the study by Matutes and Vives (1996) all the aforementioned theoretical 
studies imply a positive association between competition and fragility, and we therefore refer to 
this strand as “competition–fragility” literature. By contrast, Caminal and Matutes (2002) 
demonstrate that monopoly banks with intermediate monitoring costs can be more prone to 
originate risky loans that give rise to higher probability of subsequent failure. Similarly, 
Nagaraja and Sealey (1995) illustrate that forbearing regulatory policies are likely to decrease 
the quality of bank assets. Using a dynamic duopolistic model, Perotti and Suarez (2002) 
investigate potential failure of financial firms due to competition and argue that the failed 
institution can be either closed or merged with another agent, highlighting the trade-off between 
stability and competition. If no new competitor enters the market, the surviving bank will 
benefit from the failure, a consequence referred to as the ”last bank standing” effect. This effect 
strengthens the institution’s incentive to act prudently as higher rents can be generated if the 
competitor fails. Perotti and Suarez (2002) show that an active merger policy by the regulatory 
agency which encourages takeovers of failed institutions contributes to banking stability. These 
three latter studies can thus be assigned to the “competition–stability” strand in the literature.  
 
Allen and Gale (2004) however argue that the relationship between competition and financial 
stability is multifaceted and that a mere consideration of the trade-off between competition and 
stability is inappropriate. Rather, they identify the efficient levels of both competition and 
stability by reviewing a number of different theoretical models and conclude that different 
models yield different answers. Allen and Gale (2004) maintain that perfect competition propels 
the socially optimal level of stability if financial markets and contracts between customers and 
intermediaries are complete. In a number of other instances however, where deposit insurance is 
present or where institutions compete heavily for deposits due to increasing returns to scale, 
competition tends to weaken bank soundness. Finally, they highlight that fragility also depends 
on the structure of the interbank market: Contagion effects arising from small liquidity shocks 
in a perfectly competitive interbank market where all institutions are price takers can force all 
the banks to liquidate assets. Similar to Allen and Gale (2004), Boyd and others (2004) also put 
forward that the probability of observing a banking crises does not only dependent on the degree 
of competition. Rather, monetary policy is a major determinant as well. Monopolistic banking 
systems are found to be more fragile if the rate of inflation is below a certain threshold, whereas 
more competitive banking markets are more vulnerable if inflation is above this threshold.  
 
The empirical literature is largely characterized by studies that focus on one or two individual 
countries. Influential work by Keeley (1990) finds a highly significant relationship between the 
erosion of bank charter values in the United States and increased competition and hence offers 
empirical support for the “competition–fragility” hypothesis. Bordo, Redish, and Rockoff 
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(1995) embark on a comparison of the Canadian and U.S. banking system between 1920 and 
1980 and report that Canadian banks failed less often than U.S. institutions, a finding they 
assign to the oligopolistic structure of the Canadian banking system. Capie (1995) reviews 
stability and efficiency in the U.K. banking market between 1840 and 1940 and concludes that a 
less competitive environment contributed to a period during which no major disruptions 
surfaced. Hoggarth, Milne, and Wood (1998) contrast the German and U.K. banking systems 
over the past few decades and report that profits in the U.K. were higher, but also more variable 
than in Germany and infer that the less competitive German system can be perceived to be more 
stable. Finally, Staikouras and Wood (2000) run similar analyses for Greece and Spain and find 
that Spanish institutions are both more profitable and more stable than Greek banks. 
 
Assigning the empirical studies to either the “competition–fragility” literature or “competition – 
stability” literature is more ambiguous than for the theoretical research. The work by Keeley 
(1990), Capie (1995), Bordo, Redish, and Rockoff (1995) and Hoggarth, Milne, and Wood 
(1998) can be classified into the “competition – fragility” literature suggesting a possible trade-
off between competition and stability, while the paper by Staikouras and Wood (2000) is a 
prime example of empirical analysis finding no such trade-off.  
 
D.   Regulation, Supervision and Stability 
 
Fischer and Chenard (1997) explore the link between liberalization, regulation, and stability. 
They offer both theoretical and empirical evidence that banking system deregulation increases 
systemic risk which they attribute to, inter alia, intensified competition in the aftermath of 
deregulation and the increased contestability of the banking systems under consideration. 
Similarly, Drees and Pazarbasioglu (1998) state that the Nordic banking crises coincided with a 
period of liberalization in the respective countries’ financial systems that gave rise to 
unsustainable behavior by both lenders and borrowers. By contrast, Barth, Caprio, and Levine 
(2004) draw on a large database on financial regulation and supervision to investigate the 
regulatory environment that sets the stage for systemic banking crises, and document that less 
contestable banking systems with higher entry barriers and activity restrictions exhibit higher 
degrees of fragility, a finding corroborated by Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt, and Levine (2005a, 
2005b). Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004) hypothesize that the lower propensity to suffer 
systemic problems in more contestable markets with fewer restrictions imposed upon 
institutions is attributable to higher levels of efficiency of financial institutions operating in such 
an environment. This suggests that contestability of markets and the supervisory framework 
play an important role in the likelihood of observing systemic problems. However, the variables 
that aim to capture the contestability of the market in these studies may not adequately control 
for the legal and institutional environment, in which financial institutions operate. This would 
explain the contradicting conclusions drawn by Fischer and Chenard (1997) on the one hand 
and by Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004) on the other. Thus, little agreement has been reached 
as to whether contestability and strengthening the regulatory framework of banking systems 
contributes to banking stability. We therefore consider the findings that more contestable 
markets and fewer restrictions are supportive of financial stability as tentative in nature. In fact, 
related research by Podpiera (2004) that investigates the relationship between compliance with 
Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision and banking sector performance as 
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measured by nonperforming loans and net interest margins puts forward that higher compliance 
with Basel Core Principles significantly improves bank asset quality, even after controlling for 
the level of development of the country and the macroeconomic setting. However, his study 
does not account for the contestability of the banking systems under consideration.  
 
In summary, the review of several related studies on the links between concentration and 
competition, regulation, and stability indicates that neither theoretical work nor empirical 
research provides clear-cut answers to the question whether competition increases or decreases 
financial stability. The assertion of trade-offs between competition and financial stability is 
challenged by recent advancements in the theoretical literature. Likewise, empirical research to 
date is largely dominated by studies on individual countries and the virtual absence of cross-
country studies involving more than two jurisdictions renders the literature and the findings 
drawn to date far from conclusive. 
 
III.   METHODOLOGY 
 
We utilize two different estimation procedures to asses the relationship between competition 
and stability, and also provide an exposition of the Panzar and Rosse (1987) measure of 
competition.  
 
A.   Duration Analysis 
 
First, we introduce a parametric duration model with time-varying covariates to investigate the 
timing of systemic banking crises. While duration analysis has been used at the micro level to 
analyze failures of financial firms (Lane, Looney, and Wansley, 1986; Whalen, 1991) we are 
not aware of any macro level studies that draw upon this methodological approach. We 
therefore briefly review some key characteristics of duration analysis. 
 
Our duration model measures the time to transition from a sound banking system to the 
occurrence of a systemic crisis. The crucial difference from the frequently employed logit 
models (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998, 2005) presented in the subsequent section is as 
follows: Logit models yield the unconditional probability of observing a banking crisis in a 
certain jurisdiction and all observations are ”stacked” such that the panel data structure is not 
appropriately accounted for. By contrast, duration models with time-varying covariates, if 
interpreted in the proportional hazards metric, provide the conditional probability of observing a 
banking crisis at point t, given that no such crisis has occurred in the country until period t.  
 
The time until a crisis is observed can be formalized as a probability density function of time t. 
A convenient way of describing survival of a banking system past time t is through its survivor 
function  
 
)()( tTPtS ≥= ,        (1) 
which equals one minus the cumulative distribution function of T. Therefore, we can compute 
the conditional probability of leaving the state of being a sound banking system within the time 
interval t until t + h, given survival until time t, as 
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}{ tThttTtP ≥+〈〈≤ .       (2) 
This probability can be divided by h, to calculate the instantaneous rate of failure, i.e. the 
average probability of leaving per unit time period over the interval t until t + h such that the 
hazard function can be written as 
 
h
tThttTtP
t
h
}{
lim)(
0
≥+〈〈≤= ↓λ )(
)()(log
tS
tf
dt
tSd =−= .   (3) 
In the econometric literature, researchers frequently assume a proportional hazards 
specification, where  
)exp()(
}),(,{
lim)),(,(
0 toh
Xt
h
tXtThtTtP
tXt βλββλ ′=≥+≤≤↓ ,   (4) 
whereby Xt denotes our time-varying explanatory variables, β is the vector of parameters to be 
estimated, λ0(t) is the baseline hazard function and )exp( tXβ ′  provides a convenient 
interpretation of the coefficients due to its non-negativity. The baseline hazard λ0(t) determines 
the shape of the hazard function with respect to time. We estimate the duration model based on 
the exponential distribution. This form assumes a constant hazard rate over time. This is 
justified given that countries, contrary to individuals or firms, do not exhibit a life cycle. Thus, 
the hazard of experiencing a systemic banking crisis does not depend on the ”age” of a country. 
Previously employed duration models in the finance literature frequently use constant covariates 
from the beginning of the measurement period t0 to the time of the measurement T = ti. This is a 
serious problem in these earlier models since it would be inappropriate to assume that the 
macroeconomic setting remains constant during the entire sampling period. In order to 
overcome this limitation, we therefore expand the methodology by using time-varying 
covariates (Petersen, 1986). The model is then estimated using the maximum likelihood 
estimation technique.  
 
We observe 38 countries over the period 1980–2003. A country’s duration is determined by the 
number of spans it remains in the data set. Thus, the minimum duration is t = 1 if the banking 
crisis was experienced in the first span and the maximum duration is t = 23 if the crisis occurred 
in 2003 or if the country never records a crisis.4 In addition, in countries that have never 
experienced a systemic crisis, our duration data are ”right censored,” in the sense that the 
studied event has not occurred during the sampling period. The initial setup of our data set with 
up to 23 time spans per country is well suited for duration analysis with time-varying covariates 
as the hazard function is modeled as a step function with different values for the covariates 
through the intervals between t = 0 and t = ti, the terminal value of the observation, at which 
either censoring or exit takes place.  
                                                 
4 Since duration analysis focuses on time spans for each country rather than ”physical” observations, the estimator 
utilizes data from the end of the first span and consequently disregards the values of the first observation. 
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Coefficients can be reported in both the accelerated failure time metric and in the proportional 
hazards metric when estimating exponential duration models since they can be parametrized in 
the form  
jxjj xt εββ ++= 0)ln(        (5) 
as accelerated failure time model or in the corresponding hazard metric as 
)exp()()( 00 xjj xthxth ββ += .      (6) 
Since we are interested in time to failure, we report our coefficients in the accelerated failure 
time (AFT) metric. These models are called AFT models because the effect of the independent 
variables is to accelerate or decelerate time to crisis. In the AFT models, a distribution is 
assumed for  
 
jxjj tx )exp( βτ −=          (7) 
and )exp( xjx β− is usually referred to as the acceleration parameter. We can rearrange (7) such 
that 
jxjj xt τβ )exp(=         (8) 
and therefore write 
)ln()ln( jxjj xt τβ += .       (9) 
The exponential accelerated failure time model assumes jτ  ~ Exponential{exp(β0)} with mean 
exp(β0) such that 
 
)ln()ln( jxjj xt τβ += and       (10) 
jxjj uxt ++= ββ0)ln( ,        (11) 
where uj follows the extreme-value distribution. Transforming the proportional hazards metric 
to the accelerated failure time metric in an exponential duration model is thus merely one of 
flipping the signs of regression coefficients (Cleves, Gould, and Gutierrez, 2004).  
 
B.   Logistic Probability Analysis 
 
Second, we also estimate a more commonly used logit probability model that takes the form  
 
[ ] [ ]{ }∑ ∑= = ′−−+′= Tt ni tiXFtiPtiXFtiPLnL ...1 ...1 )),((1ln)),(1()),((ln),( ββ ,  (12) 
where P (i,t) is a dummy variable that takes on the value one when a systemic banking crisis is 
observed or zero otherwise. The parameter β is the vector of coefficients to be estimated and the 
explanatory variables are denoted by X (i,t). Due to the common use of this model, we refrain 
here from a more detailed exposition of this estimator and refer the interested reader to the work 
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by Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998, 2005). In terms of comparability between the two 
modeling techniques, it has to be recognized that the duration model draws on a fewer number 
of crisis observations due to the fact that it focuses on spans of time and disregards the values of 
the explanatory values of the first observation per country. While this decreases the variation in 
the dependent variable in comparison to the logit model, it is not a major impediment to our 
analysis, as the two methodological approaches are complementary (which is largely 
corroborated by our findings).  
C.   Panzar and Rosse (1987) H-Statistic 
 
The H-Statistic, frequently used in the “new empirical industrial organization literature,” is 
designed to discriminate between competitive, monopolistically competitive, and monopolistic 
markets. Claessens and Laeven (2004) argue that the H-Statistic is a more appropriate measure 
for the degree of competition than previously used proxies for competitive conduct. Studies by 
Bikker and Haaf (2002) and Bikker (2004) also use this approach. Shaffer (2004) argues that the 
analytical strength and superiority of the H-Statistic over previously used measures of 
competition is based on its formal derivation from profit-maximizing equilibrium conditions. 
Moreover, the statistic is robust with respect to the market since it only draws upon 
characteristics of reduced-form revenue equations at the firm level. Its limitation lies in the fact 
that the inferences based on the statistic are only valid if the market is in (or close to) 
equilibrium. The measure is based on a general banking market model which determines 
equilibrium output and the number of institutions by maximizing profits at both the firm and the 
industry level. Precisely, bank i maximizes profit when marginal revenue equals marginal cost  
 
( ) 0),,(,, =′−′ iiiiiii twxCznxR ,         (13) 
 
whereby iR′  denotes revenues and iC ′  refers to costs of bank i. Output of bank i is denoted by xi 
and n characterizes the number of institutions. The term wi is the vector of m input prices for 
bank i and zi and ti are vectors of exogenous variables that shift the banks revenue and cost 
functions respectively. Adopting similar line of reasoning for the market level yields the 
following equation such that the zero profit condition constraint is maintained 
 ( ) ( ) 0,,,, ***** =− twxCznxR ii ,        (14) 
where the asterisks denote equilibrium values. Under perfect competition, increases in input 
prices cause marginal costs and total revenues to increase by the same amount as the costs 
increase. By contrast, under monopoly conditions increases in input prices raise marginal cost, 
reduce equilibrium output, and thereby reduce total revenue. The H-Statistic measures market 
power by the extent to which a change in factor input prices, ( )
ikdw , translates into equilibrium 
revenues, ( )*idR , earned by bank i. In short, the H-Statistic is a measure of the sum of the 
elasticities of the reduced-form revenues with respect to factor prices and is computed as  
 
∑
= ∂
∂=
m
k i
k
k
i
R
w
w
R
H i
i1
*
*
.         (15) 
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Thus, the H-Statistic is an increasing function of the demand elasticity, suggesting that as H 
increases the less market power is exercised on the part of the banks. Therefore, the magnitude 
of H can be perceived as a measure of competition and interpretation is straightforward: 
 
H ≤ 0 indicates monopoly equilibrium 
0 < H <1 indicates monopolistic competition 
H = 1 indicates perfect competition 
 
IV.   DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 
We focus the empirical analysis on a set of 38 countries during the period 1980–2003. The 
sample is slightly smaller than in previous studies on systemic banking problems since we have 
to constrain the sample to countries for which the H-Statistic as computed by Claessens and 
Laeven (2004) is readily available. Descriptive statistics for the entire set of variables are 
presented in Table 1. Detailed explanation of the variables and their sources is provided in the 
Appendix.  
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Mean Std.Dev. Minimum Maximum 
GDP growth (real) 3.20 3.13 -13.13 14.82 
Real interest rate 1.59 25.49 -558.91 48.86 
Inflation 16.67 83.40 -16.33 2076.79 
Terms of Trade -0.72 33.98 -607.00 622.00 
Depreciation 19.14 116.21 -320.37 2421.59 
M2/international reserves 10.06 9.37 0.78 59.48 
Credit growth (real) 73.76 171.60 -256.35 1421.95 
Moral hazard index 1.41 0.72 0.00 2.03 
Concentration 0.47 0.13 0.16 0.69 
H-Statistic 0.67 0.12 0.41 0.92 
British legal origin 0.16 0.36 0 1 
French legal origin 0.51 0.50 0 1 
German legal origin 0.03 0.17 0 1 
Scandinavian legal origin  0.02 0.15 0 1 
Activity restrictions 9.36 2.59 5 15 
Capital regulatory index 5.94 1.45 3 9 
Government ownership 0.47 0.34 0 1 
Foreign ownership 0.18 0.24 0 0.95 
 
GDP growth is the rate of real growth of the Gross Domestic Product. Real interest rate is the nominal interest rate minus the rate of inflation. 
Inflation is the rate of change of the GDP deflator. Terms of trade is the change in net barter terms of trade. Depreciation is a measure of the 
change of the exchange rate. M2/international reserves measures the ratio of broad money over international reserves. Credit growth (real) is the 
rate of growth of domestic credit divided by the GDP deflator. Moral hazard index is the first principal component of a variety of deposit 
insurance design features as detailed in the Appendix. Concentration measures the proportion of assets held by the three largest institutions in a 
country, averaged over the sampling period 1980–2003. H-Statistic is a measure of competitiveness in the financial services industry. British, 
French, German and Scandinavian legal origin are dummies that take on the value one if a country’s legal system has British, French, German 
or Scandinavian origin or zero otherwise. Activity restrictions is an index variable that measures barriers to entry into different banking 
activities (securities, insurance, real estate and ownership of nonfinancial firms). Capital regulatory index is a variable that captures capital 
stringency in the industry. Government and foreign ownership measure the proportion of ownerships rights held by the government and foreign 
entities respectively. 
 
Our crisis variable is a dummy that takes on the value one if a systemic banking crisis surfaced 
in the particular year of observation or zero otherwise. We use the widely employed Demirgüç-
Kunt and Detragiache (2005) dating scheme as root source for episodes of systemic banking 
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problems. Accordingly, one of the following criteria has to be met by a country to be classified 
as having experienced a systemic crisis: i) emergency measures such as deposit freezes or bank 
holidays are implemented; ii) large-scale bank nationalizations take place; iii) non-performing 
assets reach at least 10 percent of total assets; iv) fiscal cost of the rescue operations reach 2 
percent of GDP. Following these classifications and depending on the model specification, we 
record up to 28 systemic crises between 1980 and 2003 that can be utilized for the logit model 
and present an overview on these countries in Table 1. The number of counts for the duration 
analysis is slightly lower, depending again on the model specification because the duration 
model focuses on the span of time between two records rather than actual ‘physical’ 
observations. Thus, the estimator captures the information at the end of the span and therefore 
disregards values of the first observation per country in the initial data set. The differing number 
of observations between the duration and the logit model is entirely due to the different setup of 
the data for the duration model to account for multiple crises per country.5 The dependent 
variable in the duration models is the log of the time to crisis, whereby the crisis dating follows 
the exposition provided above.  
 
Information on the H-Statistic as a measure for competitiveness is taken from Claessens and 
Laeven (2004). They derived the statistic along the lines presented in Section III.C and also test 
for long-run equilibrium. Using data for the period 1994–2001, Claessens and Laeven (2004) 
compute this competitiveness measure and include all commercial, savings, co-operative banks 
and bank holding companies across a sample of 50 countries.6 We use this sample as a starting 
point and exclude countries for which we do not have a sufficient number of observations for 
the explanatory variables and transition economies as including them would distort estimation. 
We record 38 countries that satisfy our sampling criteria. Table 1 suggests that monopolistic 
competition is the most appropriate way of describing the level of competition in the countries 
of study. While our sample tracks back until 1980, the information on the measure of 
competitiveness is only available for the more recent period and we therefore assume it to be 
constant over the sampling period. This is justified, given the following four arguments: First, 
no data set other than the one by Claessens and Laeven (2004) offers information on a 
sufficiently large cross-country sample that can be utilized for the purpose of our study. Second, 
the regulatory and supervisory environment, found to be a major determinant for the degree of 
competition by Claessens and Laeven (2004), has not undergone major changes according to 
Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001) in the aftermath of banking problems. By extension, we 
therefore argue that the level of competition has likewise not seen much change over time. 
Third, Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt, and Levine (2005b) contemplate that in cases where the 
regulatory environment has changed, it was modified toward less rather than more regulation. 
This therefore biases our results against finding a positive relationship between competition and 
systemic banking fragility. Fourth, recent work by Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2005) indicates 
                                                 
5 For details on the setup of the data with multiple instances of events per cross-sectional unit and the different 
notion of  “sample size” in duration modeling, see Cleves, Gould, and Gutierrez (2004).  
6  Employing four different estimation techniques and averaging the results provides according to the authors close 
estimates of the H-Statistic for each jurisdiction. We refer the interested reader to the work by Claessens and 
Laeven (2004) and the literature cited therein for additional details. 
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that no considerable alterations in the regulatory environment have taken place since the initial 
survey by Barth and his co-authors in 1999, which reinforces our assumption that the 
competitive environment has likewise remained stable over time.  
 
The fact that previous studies relied upon concentration as a proxy for competition and report a 
significantly negative association between concentration and the likelihood of suffering 
systemic crises suggests that we enter concentration into our regression equations. While this 
may give rise to multicollinearity, it is a way to investigate if the contemplated link between 
concentration and fragility holds when competitive conduct of financial institutions is included 
in the equations.7 Earlier empirical results on the concentration–fragility nexus would have to be 
re-evaluated, if concentration is no longer found to be significant in our analyses. Furthermore, 
this would lend empirical support to the assertion that concentration and competition are two 
different concepts. We therefore use a concentration variable obtained from Beck, Demirgüc-
Kunt, and Levine (2005a, 2005b) who retrieve information on the market share of the three 
largest institutions in each country in their sample from Bankscope and average it for the period 
1988–97 to smooth out coverage problems. Following this approach, we additionally 
incorporate concentration ratios using additional data for the years 1998–2003 to widen the 
scope.  
 
 
                                                 
7  The correlation between concentration and the H-Statistic is 0.1503.  
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Table 2. Banking Sector Crises 1/ 
 
Country Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2005) 
Argentina 1980-82, 1989-90, 1995, 2001-02* 
Australia  
Austria  
Bangladesh  
Belgium  
Canada  
Colombia 1982-85, 1999-00 
Costa Rica 1994-97 * 
Denmark  
Ecuador 1995-02* 
France  
Germany  
Greece  
Honduras  
Hong Kong, 
China 
 
India 1991-94** 
Indonesia 1992-95**, 1997-02 * 
Italy 1990-95 
Japan 1992-02* 
Kenya 1993-95 
Luxembourg  
Malaysia 1997–2001 
Mexico 1982, 1994-97 
Netherlands  
Nigeria 1991–95 
Norway 1987-93 
Pakistan  
Panama 1988–89 
Paraguay 1995-99 
Philippines 1981-87, 1988-02 * 
Portugal 1986-89 
South Africa 1985 
Spain  
Switzerland  
Turkey 1982, 1991, 1994, 2000-02 * 
United 
Kingdom 
 
United States 1980-92 
Venezuela 1993-97 
 
1/ Episodes for the occurrence of systemic banking crises are taken from Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2005). * indicates that the crisis is 
still going on as at 2005. A four-year duration of a crisis is indicated by **. Additional details are provided in the Appendix. 
We also include the following commonly employed macroeconomic control variables in the 
model specifications: Real GDP growth, the real interest rate, the rate of inflation, changes in 
the terms of trade, changes in the foreign exchange rate, the ratio of M2 to gross foreign 
reserves, and credit growth. To avoid simultaneity problems, we lag all these macroeconomic 
variables by one period. We also account for the finding by Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 
(2002) that generously designed deposit insurance schemes tend to weaken bank stability and 
incorporate an updated version of their moral hazard index. This index is computed as the first 
principal component of eight deposit insurance design features that are modeled using dummy 
variables that capture coinsurance, foreign and interbank deposit coverage, type and source of 
funding, management, membership, and the level of explicit coverage. We use additional 
information from the updated database on deposit insurance design features (Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Karacaovali, and Laeven, 2005) to augment the moral hazard index by Demirgüç-Kunt and 
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Detragiache (2002) using additional dummy variables for the design features regarding risk-
adjusted premiums, the deposit insurer’s power to revoke bank licenses and its ability to 
intervene in a bank. In a similar vein to the original version, we find that the first principal 
component explains well over 80 percent in the variation of the design features.8 We also 
consider regressors that capture the legal origin of the country. This is due to the fact that La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1998) contemplate that legal origin is a major 
determinant for the legal protection of creditor rights which, in turn, play a key role for the 
financial system of a country. Furthermore, Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt, and Levine (2003) argue that 
these proxies ought to be controlled for when analyzing the performance of banking systems 
since legal origin helps explain cross-country differences in financial development.  
 
To provide additional robustness tests for the relationship between competition and fragility, we 
also test the effect of including a variety of regulatory variables. If consideration of these 
variables diminishes the significance of the H-Statistic in our results, we could conclude that the 
relationship between competition and fragility may be spurious and attributable to the failure to 
control for the regulatory environment. Moreover, as we are also interested in learning whether 
or not the timing of banking crises depends on the design features of the regulatory 
environment, we incorporate variables that capture the regulatory and institutional setting in 
which banks operate in. As a consequence, we initially investigate the effect of some proxies for 
the contestability of banking markets such as activity restrictions and a capital regulatory index. 
Detailed explanations for these regulatory variables are provided in the Appendix and by Barth , 
Caprio, and Levine (2004). While information on the regulatory environment was collected 
towards the end of the 1990s, Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001) put forward that the regulatory 
environment has not undergone substantial change over time. The assertion by Barth, Caprio, 
and Levine (2004) is also substantiated by Podpiera (2004) who argues that the application of 
core principles of supervision and regulation is unlikely to change in the short run and there is a 
considerable time lag between changes in regulation and supervision until these alterations are 
observable in banking system performance.  
 
Subsequently, we consider the implications of the regulatory and institutional variables in terms 
of their impact upon survival time of banking systems. Since the relationship between the 
probability of suffering a crisis and these regressors is reversed, we do not discuss this here for 
brevity. An index of activity restrictions that captures banks’ potential to engage in securities, 
insurance, and real estate activities and whether they can own nonfinancial firms is utilized to 
check if banks can gain market power by offering a vast array of services. Increasing values of 
this index indicate more activity restrictions and we anticipate an inverse relationship between 
competition and activity restrictions that is likely to translate into increased survival time of 
banking systems. However, if fewer activity restrictions enable banks to better diversify risk, a 
negative relationship between these restrictions and time to crisis is also possible.  
 
                                                 
8 We also ran the regressions reported in Section V with the original version of the Moral Hazard Index from 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002). The results were virtually unchanged. 
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We also examine a capital regulatory index as a proxy for the entry requirements imposed by 
regulators on the capital of institutions. This serves as a further barrier to entry to the market. 
The higher the index value, the higher the entry barrier. We assume a negative association of the 
capital regulatory index with the degree of competition and also a positive relationship between 
the capital regulatory index and time to crisis. On the other hand, since lower capital 
requirements would increase competition and assuming competition boosts efficiency, a 
negative association between the capital regulatory index and survival time might be detected.  
 
To capture the effect of ownership structure in the countries’ banking systems, we include the 
proportion of bank assets controlled by foreign entities, obtained from Barth, Caprio, and 
Levine (2001) and the degree of government ownership, taken from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
and Shleifer (2002). Higher degrees of foreign ownership are interpreted as a sign for a more 
competitive environment and are therefore anticipated to shorten survival time. By contrast, if 
foreign ownership improves efficiency of the banks operating in this environment, it could 
however also increase time to crisis. Large degrees of government ownership, on the other hand, 
are likely to impede competitive behavior of financial institutions and we would therefore 
anticipate a positive relationship between government ownership and time to crisis. However, 
empirical work by Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004) suggests a weakly positive association 
between government ownership and bank fragility.  
 
V.   REGRESSION RESULTS 
 
We report the main results obtained from the duration and logit models in Section V.A and 
numerous robustness tests in Section V.B. A detailed examination of the effect of regulatory 
variables on competition, and, ultimately, banking system soundness and time to crisis is 
presented in Section V.C. 
 
A.   Main Results 
 
We present the main results of our analyses in Table 3. The coefficients obtained from the 
duration model are reported in Specification (1)–(4) and we re-examine the findings from the 
duration analysis with the more commonly utilized logit model in Specification (5)–(8). The 
number of observations in the duration models is greater than in the logit models since the data 
set has to be set up differently for analyzing duration data with multiple crises. When 
interpreting results, it is important to consider that the signs for the coefficients are reversed 
between the two different modeling techniques: A positive sign in the duration model indicates 
increased time to crisis and can therefore be interpreted as contributing to increased stability 
whereas a positive sign in the logit model implies a greater probability of experiencing a 
systemic crisis. 
 
Specification (1) and (5) are our canonical models that include previously used explanatory 
variables, whereby we additionally incorporate three dummy variables for the origin of the legal 
system (British, French and Scandinavian legal origin) since it is a major determinant for 
differences in the development of financial systems. We capture German legal origin in the 
intercept to avoid perfect collinearity. In Specifications (2) and (6) we include the H-Statistic in 
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the equations and the averaged three bank concentration ratio additionally enters the equations 
in Specification (3) and (7). The final Specifications (4) and (8) include an interaction term 
between the H-Statistic and concentration, to control for possible nonlinear relationships.  
 
In the duration model, the H-Statistic enters Specification (2) and (3) positively and 
significantly at the 1 and 5 percent level, respectively. The positive sign for the coefficient 
implies that time to crisis increases as the degree of competitive behavior among financial 
institutions increases and therefore does not support the view that competitiveness gives rise to 
banking system vulnerabilities. This core result will persist throughout the remainder of the 
paper with only minor changes observed. Moreover, our finding for the positive effect of the 
level of competition for banking system soundness also holds when the level of concentration is 
controlled for.9 While concentration also enters with a positive coefficient in Specification (3) 
suggesting that survival time is lengthened in more concentrated banking systems, its effect on 
time to crisis is however rendered insignificant. Neither competition nor concentration assumes 
significance when the interaction term between the two is included in Specification (4).10 This 
analysis provides suggestive evidence that competitive behavior contributes to increased 
survival time of banking systems.11  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 We investigated whether the significance of the H-Statistic is due to spurious correlation between certain 
dummies for legal origin and the H-Statistic and therefore tested alternate specifications of the equation with 
dummies for German, French and Scandinavian legal origin, and British, German, and Scandinavian legal origin. 
However, the impact upon the H-Statistic is virtually unchanged. Additionally, we replaced the three dummy 
variables for legal origin with the variable GDP (real) per capita as a proxy for the institutional environment in 
unreported regressions. These results again confirm the significantly positive relationship between the H-Statistic 
and the timing of banking crises and the significantly negative relationship between competition and the probability 
of suffering a crisis. These additional results can be obtained from the authors upon request.  
10 In unreported regressions, we drop the two variables H-Statistic and concentration and only include the 
interaction term between the two. This interaction term enters the equation in the duration model positively and 
significantly at the 5 percent level. We obtain the corresponding negative and significant sign at the one percent 
level for the logit model. The results are available upon request from the authors. 
11 We also analyzed if our results are sensitive to using different techniques for the specification of the duration 
model and estimated a semiparametric Cox proportional hazards model with time-varying covariates that does not 
assume any parametric form for the baseline hazard function. This analysis produces very similar results with 
respect to the contribution of the H-Statistic to increased banking system soundness. However, since the Cox model 
does not permit making inferences about the baseline hazard as it is left unestimated, and, given that we obtain 
more efficient estimates with the parametric duration model, we do not report these results here.  Additionally, we 
re-estimated the duration models using the Weibull distribution, which assumes λ0(t)=λαtα-1 and allows for positive 
duration dependence if α>1 and negative duration dependence if α<1. We applied a Wald test to investigate if 
ln(α)=0, which is equivalent to testing α=1. Across the four specifications, we cannot reject this hypothesis and 
conclude that it is justified assuming a constant hazard rate. The exponential model is nested within the Weibull 
model as the case α=1. The results are available upon request from the authors. 
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Table 3. Competitiveness, Timing, and Probability of Systemic Banking Crises 
 
 Duration Models  Logit Models 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
          
Constant 4.6274 0.8507 0.0802 6.5739  -5.4307 -1.1953 -0.6020 -2.8211 
 (0.6236)*** (1.5846) (1.9978) (5.2874)  (0.7062)*** (1.4726) (1.8109) (4.3279) 
GDP growth (real) -0.0691 -0.0214 -0.0184 -0.0141  0.1315 0.0787 0.0719 0.0709 
 (0.0803) (0.0904) (0.0909) (0.0880)  (0.0817) (0.0922) (0.0935) (0.0920) 
Real interest rate -0.0084 -0.0103 -0.0085 -0.0067  0.0219 0.0253 0.0235 0.0231 
 (0.0118) (0.0139) (0.0126) (0.0131)  (0.0100)** (0.0130)* (0.0130)* (0.0130)* 
Inflation -0.0021 -0.0018 -0.0010 0.0002  0.0053 0.0043 0.0036 0.0033 
 (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0022)  (0.0031)* (0.0037) (0.0039) (0.0038) 
Terms of trade 
change 
-0.0024 -0.0029 -0.0026 -0.0025  0.0002 0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0001 
 (0.0017) (0.0017)* (0.0017) (0.0018)  (0.0027) (0.0035) (0.0032) (0.0033) 
Depreciation -0.0039 -0.0025 -0.0027 -0.0030  0.0002 -0.0010 -0.0008 -0.0007 
 (0.0015)*** (0.0017) (0.0015)* (0.0014)**  (0.0023) (0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0018) 
M2/international 
reserves 
0.0138 0.0187 0.0293 0.0266  0.0057 -0.0020 -0.0110 -0.0080 
 (0.0296) (0.0305) (0.0324) (0.0319)  (0.0239) (0.0262) (0.0326) (0.0320) 
Credit growth 
(real) 
-0.0014 -0.0019 -0.0020 -0.0022  0.0010 0.0016 0.0017 0.0018 
 (0.0004)*** (0.0005)*** (0.0005)*** (0.0006)***  (0.0008) (0.0008)** (0.0008)** (0.0008)** 
Moral hazard 
index 
-0.0372 0.2685 0.2602 0.0527  0.3375 0.0299 0.0601 0.1363 
 (0.2190) (0.2772) (0.2933) (0.3306)  (0.3417) (0.3690) (0.3683) (0.3984) 
British legal origin -0.5227 -0.3812 -0.1951 -0.6531  1.1127 1.1103 1.0450 1.2049 
 (0.6629) (0.7934) (0.8777) (0.9105)  (0.8397) (0.9437) (0.9338) (0.9193) 
French legal origin -1.1209 -1.5525 -1.3319 -1.2832  1.6562 2.2597 2.1015 2.1036 
 (0.6180)* (0.5790)*** (0.5518)** (0.6086)**  (0.6230)*** (0.6465)*** (0.5998)*** (0.6185)*** 
Scandinavian legal 
origin 
-1.1441 -1.0797 -1.5069 -1.2270  1.2795 1.2279 1.5485 1.4447 
 (0.5604)** (0.5249)** (0.7134)** (0.7192)*  (1.1575) (1.1414) (1.2624) (1.2846) 
H-Statistic  5.0854 4.2562 -6.3020   -5.8513 -5.2130 -1.7627 
  (1.7922)*** (1.9919)** (8.2633)   (1.7523)*** (1.8819)*** (6.2430) 
Concentration   2.3486 -11.8460    -1.8366 2.9196 
   (2.4725) (11.2600)    (2.4980) (8.6863) 
H-Statistic * 
Concentration 
   23.9997     -7.8430 
    (18.7818)     (13.1666) 
Observations 619 619 619 619  567 567 567 567 
Number of crises 22 22 22 22  28 28 28 28 
Type I Error (%) n/a n/a n/a n/a  25.00 28.57 25.00 25.00 
Type II Error (%) n/a n/a n/a n/a  41.37 33.95 33.58 33.21 
Akaike Info. 
Criterion 0.1610 0.1555 0.1571 0.1578 
 0.400  0.387    0.390    0.393    
Pseudo R2 n/a n/a n/a n/a  0.091   0.132    0.135    0.136    
          
 
We estimate exponential duration models with time varying covariates for the period 1980–2003 in column (1) - (4) and logit models in column 
(5) - (8). The dependent variable is the log of time to crisis in the exponential duration models. The observations are right hand censored if no 
crisis surfaced during the observation period. The number of observations in the duration models is greater than in the logit models since the data 
set has to be set up differently for analysing duration data with multiple crises. If a crisis runs over multiple years, the years following the onset of 
a crisis are deleted from the data set. If a country experienced multiple crises, subsequent systemic episodes are included in the sample. The 
number of crises in the duration model setup is smaller since duration analysis focuses on time spans for each country and exploits information in 
the data at the end of each span. Therefore, values of the first observation for each country recorded in the initial data set are discarded in this 
analysis. The dependent variable in the logit models is a dummy variable that equals one if a crisis is observed or zero otherwise. All explanatory 
variables are lagged in the models by one period to avoid simultaneity problems. If a crisis runs over multiple years, the years following the onset 
of a crisis are deleted from the data set. If a country experienced multiple crises, subsequent systemic episodes are included in the sample. The 
Appendix provides detailed information on the explanatory variables. Specifications (1) and (5) are our baseline models that include covariates 
used in previous studies, whereby we update the Moral Hazard Index by Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002). We also incorporate three 
dummies for origin of the legal system, whereby we capture German legal origin in the intercept. Specifications (2) and (6) include the H-
Statistic as measure for the competitiveness of the industry and Specification (3) and (7) incorporate the level of concentration as measured by the 
three bank concentration ratio, averaged over the sampling period. To control for nonlinear relationships between the degree of competitiveness 
and the level of concentration, we include an interaction term of these two variables in Specification (4) and (8). White’s heteroskedasticity 
consistent standard errors are given in parentheses. Type I and Type II Error are calculated as the total number of crisis observations (28) divided 
by the number of observations in the sample (567); this yields a cut-off point of 0.0494. Significance levels of 1, 5 and 10 percent are indicated 
by ***, ** and *.  
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The control variable for terms of trade change is weakly significant at the 10 percent level in 
Specification (2) indicating an inverse relationship between changes in terms of trade and time 
to crisis. While this appears counterintuitive, it may be due to sample composition. The impact 
of terms of trade on time to crisis is largely determined by the countries’ dependency on 
primary commodity exports. If no such dependency is prevalent in our sample, we are unlikely 
to discover the anticipated positive sign. Moreover, previous studies also fail to consistently find 
the expected pattern. While Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2005) find no significant 
relationship with changing signs across different regressions, Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt, and Levine 
(2005a) report a negative association between the probability of observing a systemic crisis and 
adverse terms of trade shocks which would result in a positive relationship between changes in 
terms of trade and time to crisis in a duration model. Consistent with theory, the rate of 
depreciation exhibits a negative sign and enters the equations significantly in Specification (1), 
(3) and (4) since currency devaluations often pose a threat to bank profitability (Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Detragiache, 1998). Moreover, our model provides strong evidence for the ‘boom and bust’ 
hypothesis across the four specifications in that it highlights that strong credit growth shortens 
survival time of banking systems. The significant dummy for French legal origin enters 
throughout negatively and significantly suggesting that time to crisis is shorter in countries with 
French legal origin. This may be driven by weak law enforcement and comparatively less 
protection of creditor rights in countries with French legal origin than in countries with British 
legal origin as illustrated by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1998). The dummy for 
Scandinavian legal origin is likewise significant and negative across the different regressions, 
which may be again attributable to the fact that less emphasis is placed on the protection of 
creditor rights in Scandinavian countries than in jurisdictions with British legal origin (Levine, 
1998). The lack of significance of some of the macroeconomic control variables may be 
attributable to multicollinearity as underscored by Detragiache and Spilimbergo (2001). We 
nevertheless keep them in the equation to test our hypothesis regarding competitive behavior of 
financial institutions while the macroeconomic setting is controlled for.  
 
To investigate whether our findings are sensitive to different methodological approaches, we re-
run Specification (1)–(4) with the more widely used logit model and report the results in 
Specification (5)–(8). This modeling technique largely corroborates the findings obtained with 
the duration model. The H-Statistic enters Specifications (6) and (7) negatively and significantly 
at the 1 percent level.12 We compute the impact of an increase of a one standard deviation in the 
H-Statistic (0.12) using the marginal effect (-0.1498) rather than the coefficient from the logit 
model reported in Specification (7), evaluated at the mean, on the probability of observing a 
crisis (-0.1498*0.12=-0.0180) to illustrate that a one standard deviation increase in 
competitiveness decreases the probability of observing a crisis by 1.8 percent.13 This 
underscores that more competitive banking systems are more resilient to crises. The effect of 
                                                 
12 The H-Statistic is also significant when including the years following the onset of a crisis. We do not report these 
results for brevity. 
13 The results for the computation of marginal effects for the logit model can be obtained from the authors upon 
request.  
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competitive conduct is greater than the impact of increased concentration in the industry. 
Although insignificant in Specification (7), we compare the two results for illustrative purposes 
and also calculate the effect of a one standard deviation increase in concentration (0.13) upon 
fragility, using again the marginal effect (-0.0528). This decreases the probability of suffering a 
systemic crisis by 0.53 percent (-0.0528*0.13). When the interaction between concentration and 
competitiveness is controlled for in Specification (8), these variables are no longer significant.  
 
Among the control variables, we find evidence that increases in real interest rates give rise to 
banking vulnerabilities according to Specification (5)–(8). The positive and significant 
coefficient for inflation in Specification (5) furthermore underscores that inflation is a precursor 
for banking problems. We again find evidence for the ”boom and bust” story in the literature in 
Specifications (6)–(8) where credit growth enters with a significant and positive sign. The 
dummy for French legal origin is now positively signed and significant across the logit models, 
indicating that countries with French legal origin are more prone to experience a crisis, which 
confirms the results from the duration model.  
 
The logit models provide additional information in terms of the classification accuracy. Only  
25–28 percent of the crises in the sample are misclassified according to the results of the Type I 
Error. The predictive power is aligned with previous studies and we therefore regard these 
results as satisfying. The Akaike Information Criterion suggests that Specification (2) and (6), 
that additionally incorporate the H-Statistic, are the most parsimonious model setups. However, 
since we want to perform the subsequently presented robustness tests when concentration is 
controlled for, we use Specifications (3) and (7) for the robustness tests in Sections V.B. and 
V.C. We find in neither of our two methodological approaches evidence that competitive 
behavior of banks increases banking system fragility. Moreover, the results indicate that 
concentration and competitive behavior are of distinct character and that concentration does not 
significantly impact banking system soundness when competition is controlled for.  
 
B.    Robustness Tests 
 
We perform several robustness tests using both the duration approach and the logit model in 
Table 4 whereby we omit the period 1994 – 2001 during which the H-Statistic was measured by 
Claessens and Laeven (2004) to account for the fact that the measure of competition assumes 
long run equilibrium. We furthermore employ different samples in terms of the country 
coverage and with respect to the sampling period. In addition, we use first differences of the 
macroeconomic control variables rather than levels to capture the behavior of the 
macroeconomic environment more dynamically. Since we are not specifically interested in the 
behavior of our control variables, we constrain the subsequent discussion to the H-Statistic and 
the three-bank concentration ratio.14  
 
 
                                                 
14 We do not report the results for the macroeconomic control variables, the moral hazard index and the dummies 
for legal origin in Tables 4 and 5 for space constraints. The results can be obtained from the authors upon request.  
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Table 4. Robustness Tests for Competitiveness and Timing and Probability of Crises 
 
 Duration models  Logit models 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
          
H-Statistic 6.0382 5.7925 4.9358 5.3638  -6.5980 -6.1835 -5.2564 -4.3798 
 
(2.8014)** (2.3317)** (2.4638)** (2.0009)**
* 
 (1.9158)**
* 
(2.2136)**
* 
(2.1689)** (2.3654)* 
Concentration -0.0476 4.5866 0.3286 4.8894  -0.1835 -3.8898 -1.0092 -0.8001 
 (2.3974) (3.2740) (2.3985) (3.4130)  (2.0577) (2.7648) (1.9934) (3.0274) 
Observations 388 534 594 504  395 481 538 452 
Number of crises 13 19 21 20  20 25 25 21 
Type I Error (%) n/a n/a n/a n/a  28.27% 16.00 32.00 23.81 
Type II Error (%) n/a n/a n/a n/a  25.00% 28.73 30.02 32.48 
Akaike Info. Criterion 0.2368 0.1453 0.1484 0.2002  0.418 0.395   0.379 0.397    
Pseudo R2 n/a n/a n/a n/a  0.133 0.1761    0.129 0.108    
To investigate the robustness of the results presented in Table 3, we perform several robustness tests using Specification (3) and (7) from 
Table 3 for the duration and the logit model respectively. The control variables are not reported for brevity and the results can be obtained 
from the authors upon request. We estimate exponential duration models in Specification (1)-(4) and logit models in Specification (5)-(8), 
whereby Specifications (1) and (5) omit the years 1994 – 2001 during which the H-Statistic was measured by Claessens and Laeven (2004). 
We exclude in Specification (2) and (6) low-income economies as defined by the World Bank (Bangladesh, India, Kenya, Nigeria and 
Pakistan) and use first differences rather than levels for the macroeconomic control variables in Specification (3) and (7). The sampling 
horizon is constrained to the period 1985–2003 in Specification (4) and (8). The dependent variable is the log of time to crisis in the 
exponential duration models. The observations are right hand censored if no crisis surfaced during the observation period. The number of 
observations in the duration models is greater than in the logit models since the data set has to be set up differently for analysing duration data 
with multiple crises. The number of crises in the duration model setup is smaller since duration analysis focuses on time spans for each 
country and exploits information in the data at the end of each span. Therefore, values of the first observation for each country recorded in the 
initial data set are discarded in this analysis. The dependent variable in the logit models is a dummy variable that equals one if a crisis is 
observed or zero otherwise. All explanatory variables are lagged in the models by one period to avoid simultaneity problems. If a crisis runs 
over multiple years, the years following the onset of a crisis are deleted from the data set. If a country experienced multiple crises, subsequent 
systemic episodes are included in the sample. The Appendix provides detailed information on the explanatory variables. White’s 
heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors are given in parentheses. Type I and Type II Error are calculated as the total number of crisis 
observations divided by the number of observations in the sample. Significance levels of 1, 5 and 10 percent are indicated by ***, ** and *.  
 
Specifications (1)–(4) in Table 4 depict the results for four robustness tests obtained with the 
duration models and Specifications (5)–(8) report the findings from the logit models. In order to 
capture the effect of concentration, we employ Specifications (3) and (7) from Table 3 for the 
robustness tests. Regressions (1) and (5) in Table 4 omit the period 1994 – 2001 for which 
Claessens and Laeven (2004) measure the H-Statistic. This approach helps account for the fact 
that the H-Statistic assumes long run equilibrium. Given that crises, consolidation and changing 
environment challenge this restrictive assumption we investigate whether dropping the period 
during which the H-Statistic was measured affects our inferences. Both the duration and the 
logit model reiterate the significant relationship between competitive conduct and banking 
system soundness.15 Similarly to the results presented in Table 3, concentration is still 
insignificant in these specifications. 
 
To test for robustness of our results with respect to the level of development of the financial 
system in question, we perform two robustness tests. First, we exclude the low-income 
                                                 
15 Claessens and Laeven (2004) point out that the H-Statistic may be biased in countries with many small banks 
operating in local markets (e. g. US, Italy, France and Germany). To analyse the impact of dropping those countries 
from our dataset, we re-run the duration and logit models and again confirm the significantly positive relationship 
between competition and the timing of crises in the duration model and the significantly negative relationship in the 
logit model. The results can be obtained upon request.  
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economies as classified by the World Bank (Bangladesh, India, Kenya, Nigeria and Pakistan) 
from the sample in Specification (2) and (6) to examine sample bias. In both equations, the H-
Statistic enters significantly at the 5 and 1 percent level and shows the anticipated sign, 
suggesting that our results are not driven by sample selection. Concentration remains 
insignificant in this alternative sample. Second, we exclude major industrial countries. Both in 
the duration model and in the logit model, the point estimate of the H-statistic retains the 
anticipated sign. It is significant at 10 percent level in the logit model, and insignificant in the 
duration model; concentration remains insignificant in both models.16 
 
In order to capture whether a more dynamic measure of the behavior of the macroeconomic 
control variables impacts the link between competitiveness and fragility, we use first differences 
for the macroeconomic variables rather than levels in Regressions (3) and (7). We again find a 
positive and significant association between competitive bank behavior and time to crisis and 
the anticipated inverse relationship between the probability of observing a systemic crisis and 
competitiveness. The results of the impact of concentration on fragility remain unchanged in 
these regressions.  
 
In a final robustness check, we examine whether our results also hold for the sampling period 
1985–2003.17 Specification (4) indicates again a significant relationship between a banking 
system’s survival time and the degree of competition, while concentration remains insignificant. 
The thus far contemplated association between the H-Statistic and banking system 
vulnerabilities also holds in the logit model in (8), although both the coefficient and the level of 
significance decrease. We again cannot reject the hypothesis that concentration has no 
independent effect on fragility when competitive conduct of banks is controlled for.  
 
Thus, both the duration analysis and the logit model confirm that the impact of competitiveness 
on banking system vulnerabilities is robust subject to alternative samples, the consideration of 
more dynamic effects of the macroeconomic environment, and different sampling periods.18 We 
obtain slightly weaker results with an alternative, more judgmental definition of systemic crises. 
The effect of competitive conduct on banking system soundness only then becomes significant 
in the logit models when the years following the onset of a crisis are included in the sample. 
Importantly, our results presented in various regressions do not support the view that 
                                                 
16 For brevity, Table 4 reports only the results for the exclusion of the low-income countries. The results for the 
exclusion of the major industrial countries can be obtained from the authors upon request. In unreported 
regressions, we also test more specifically for the impact of financial sector development on the timing and 
probability of suffering systemic crises and include as an additional control variable the ratio of stock market total 
value traded to GDP. We again confirm the significantly positive association between the H-Statistic and crises in 
the duration model and the significant and negative relationship between the measure of competitiveness and crises 
in the logit model. The results are also available upon request. 
17 We also considered shortening the sampling period further, but this substantially decreases the number of crisis   
observations in the sample. Thus, we constrain the final robustness tests to the period 1985–2003. 
18 We also tested whether our results are affected by clustering the error terms and re-ran Specifications (1) – (8) 
with this alternative setup. The findings on the impact of the H-Statistic are however virtually unchanged in these 
regressions and we therefore do not report them. 
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concentration is conducive to banking system stability once competitive conduct is controlled 
for, which suggests a reconsideration of the findings reported by Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt, and 
Levine (2005a, 2005b). They put forward that bank concentration boosts banking stability but 
do not control for the effect of banks’ competitive conduct.  
 
C.   Competitiveness, Regulation and Systemic Crises 
 
The regulatory environment has an impact on the degree of competitiveness in the banking 
industry (e.g., Claessens and Laeven, 2004). As an additional robustness test, we therefore 
investigate and report in Table 5 the impact of competition on banking system soundness while 
controlling for a set of regulatory and institutional variables. As mentioned previously, if 
incorporation of these variables diminishes the significance of the H-Statistic, we could 
conclude that competition does not have an independent effect on banking system vulnerability. 
Moreover, an analysis of the design features of the regulatory environment on the timing of 
systemic problems appears independently beneficial. We again constrain the following 
discussion to the H-Statistic and the three-bank concentration ratio.  
 
Table 5. Regulatory Environment, Contestability, and the Timing and Probability of Crises 
 
 Duration models  Logit models 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 … … … …  … … … … 
H-Statistic 4.3392 4.4300 3.8345 3.6107  -5.7529 -5.4366 -5.3887 -4.3336 
 (2.3380)* (2.1107)** (3.2015) (1.9182)*  (2.3421)** (2.0885)*** (2.9989)* (2.0670)** 
Concentration 2.1585 2.7230 1.0349 2.7449  -0.4683 -2.4233 -0.2124 -2.0229 
 (2.3569) (2.2381) (2.9230) (2.3386)  (2.3656) (2.2404) (3.2036) (2.4477) 
Activity restrictions -0.1077     0.3427    
 (0.1042)     (0.1514)**    
Capital regulatory index  -0.1924     0.4580   
  (0.2313)     (0.3995)   
Foreign ownership   -2.6596     0.9981  
   (1.6900)     (1.7759)  
Government ownership    -0.7383     0.3385 
    (0.5709)     (0.6596) 
Observations 598 598 409 598  547 547 371 545 
Number of crises 22 22 18 22  28 28 20 28 
Type I Error (%) n/a n/a n/a n/a  17.86 25.00 25.00 21.43 
Type II Error (%) n/a n/a n/a n/a  31.98 29.29 27.07 31.53 
Akaike Info. Crit. 0.1609 0.1611 0.1829 0.1631  0.393 0.401 0.432 0.404 
Pseudo R2 n/a n/a n/a n/a  0.163 0.144 0.151 0.1376 
 
Using specification (3) and (7) from Table 3 and utilizing the sample for 1980–2003, we control for the regulatory and institutional 
environment. The control variables are not reported for brevity and the results can be obtained from the authors upon request. We estimate 
exponential duration models in Specification (1) - (4) and logit models in Specification (5) - (8). The dependent variable is the log of time to 
crisis in Specification (1)–(4) and a dummy variable that takes on the value one if a crisis is observed or zero otherwise. The observations are 
right hand censored if no crisis surfaced during the observation period. All explanatory variables are lagged in the models by one period to 
avoid simultaneity problems. The number of observations in the duration models is greater than in the logit models since the data set has to be 
set up differently for analyzing duration data with multiple crises. The number of crises in the duration model setup is smaller since duration 
analysis focuses on time spans for each country and exploits information in the data at the end of each span. Therefore, values of the first 
observation for each country recorded in the initial data set are discarded in this analysis. All explanatory variables are lagged in the models 
by one period to avoid simultaneity problems. If a crisis runs over multiple years, the years following the onset of a crisis are deleted from the 
data set. If a country experienced multiple crises, subsequent systemic episodes are included in the sample. The equations additionally 
include variables that capture activity restrictions (1) and (5) and a capital regulatory index (2) and (6) to examine the effect of barriers to 
entry to the market. We also incorporate regressors to analyze the impact of foreign ownership (3) and (7) and a variable to examine the 
effect of government ownership (4) and (8). The Appendix provides detailed information on the explanatory variables. White’s 
heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors are given in parentheses. Type I and Type II Error are calculated as the total number of crisis 
observations divided by the number of observations in the sample. Significance levels of 1, 5, and 10 percent are indicated by ***, ** and *.  
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Table 5 presents the results for both the duration and the logit model. To avoid collinearity 
problems, we enter the additional variables for the regulatory environment one at a time. Even 
when controlling for barriers to entry such as activity restrictions in Specification (1), a capital 
regulatory index in Specification (2), and government ownership in Specification (4), our core 
result that more competitive banking systems exhibit increased survival time prevails at the five 
and 10 percent significance level. The H-Statistic is only rendered insignificant when foreign 
ownership is included in Specification (3). None of the regulatory and ownership variables 
enters the equation at meaningful levels of significance in the duration model. The results 
however improve in the logit model as illustrated in Specification (5)–(8). The negative 
coefficient for the H-Statistic underscores again that banking systems with higher degrees of 
competition are more resilient to systemic crises and that including additional variables that 
shape the competitive environment of a banking system does not drive out the significance of 
the H-Statistic which enters with significance levels between 1 and 10 percent.19 Moreover, the 
variable that captures activity restrictions becomes positive and significant at the 5 percent 
level. This indicates that a more restrictive environment is conducive to the buildup of banking 
system vulnerabilities, a finding consistent with the work by Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt, and Levine 
(2005a, 2005b) and Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004). The inference to be drawn is that the 
regulatory and institutional environment do not play a major role for the likelihood and timing 
of systemic banking problems. However, we do not find evidence to substantiate the findings by 
Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt, and Levine (2005a, 2005b) that increased concentration contributes to 
banking system stability since concentration remains insignificant across all specifications in the 
duration and in the logit models.  
 
In sum, our results offer evidence that competitive behavior of financial institutions neither 
gives rise to systemic risk nor shortens time to crisis, even if contestability of banking markets 
and ownership structure are controlled for. At worst, competition is not found to have an 
independent effect on the likelihood and timing of systemic problems. Hence, the findings do 
not support theoretical studies of the ”competition–fragility” literature. Rather, we find support 
for the “competition–stability” view. Our results furthermore complement the work by Barth, 
Caprio, and Levine (2004) and Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt, and Levine (2005a, 2005b) on the 
relationship between regulatory and supervisory policies and banking system soundness.  
 
VI.   CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This paper provides the first empirical study of the relationship between bank competition as 
measured by the Panzar and Rosse (1987) H-Statistic and banking system stability. Using a 
cross-country data set comprising 38 countries with up to 28 systemic banking crises for the 
period 1980–2003 we find that higher degrees of competition in banking systems decrease the 
risk of suffering a systemic crisis. Moreover, we present evidence that survival time of banking 
                                                 
19 We conducted tests for nonlinear relationships and include interaction terms between the H-Statistic and the 
additionally incorporated regulatory and institutional variables. The H-Statistic enters all these duration models 
positively and significantly at the 1 and 5 percent level and shows the anticipated negative sign at the 1 and 5 
percent level in the logit models, confirming that competitive behavior lengthens time to crisis and increases 
banking system soundness. The results can be obtained from the authors upon request. 
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systems tends to increase in a more competitive environment. A broad set of robustness tests 
using alternative samples, different methodological approaches for the coding of the 
macroeconomic environment, and alternative sampling periods reiterate our core finding that 
more competitive banking systems are more resilient to banking problems, even when the level 
of concentration in the industry is controlled for.  
 
Thus, our results offer empirical support for the “competition–stability” theory and do not 
conform to the “competition–fragility” literature. This bolsters the view that competition and 
soundness generally go hand in hand (even though a perfectly competitive system does not 
“guarantee” absence of failures). While we qualify the conclusions in a number of aspects, the 
initial findings presented in this paper imply that banking systems with high values of the 
Panzar and Rosse (1987) H-Statistic are (i) less likely to experience a banking crisis and (ii) 
exhibit longer time to observing an episode of systemic problems as competition increases. 
Restricting the sample size by excluding low-income economies, excluding countries in which 
the measure of competition may be biased downwards, excluding major industrial economies, 
examining the period 1985–2003, omitting the period during which the H-Statistic is measured, 
and using first differences for the macroeconomic control variables rather than levels in both the 
duration analysis and in the logit model does not change the finding of our analysis. Our results 
for the logit model also hold when controlling for a set of regulatory and institutional variables 
that capture contestability of banking systems and ownership structure of banks and are only 
marginally weakened in the duration model. As a side result, the findings offer some evidence 
that a more restrictive institutional environment is conducive to the buildup of banking 
vulnerabilities, which is in line with previous research.  
 
An additional contribution of this paper is its examination of the likelihood and timing of 
suffering a systemic crisis when the degree of concentration is accounted for. In this context, 
our results reject the view that concentrated banking systems are significantly less prone to 
suffer a crisis. Therefore, the findings provide initial empirical evidence in a cross-country 
setting that competition and concentration are distinct from each other and that only competitive 
behavior of banks impacts upon the probability of suffering a systemic banking crisis whereas 
concentration does not. 
 
Further research is needed to investigate in more detail the nature of the relationship between 
competition and fragility. It is important to examine if alternative measures of competitive 
behavior confirm our initial results and which levels of competition, if any, may be optimal to 
maintain a stable banking system. Studies on the firm level using cross-country data and 
controlling for the institutional and regulatory environment would help explore this link further. 
Likewise, the exact transmission mechanism between competition and stability is an important 
subject matter. For instance, an analysis of the effects of competition in the short and in the long 
run may yield different outcomes for stability. Also, as a complement to the 0/1 (crisis/no crisis) 
measure of financial fragility used in this paper, one could use more continuous measures, such 
as distance to default, provided that practical problems with these measures (e.g., reliability of 
stock price data in shallow markets) are addressed.
 - 29 -                                                          APPENDIX 
DEFINITIONS OF VARIABLES AND DATA SOURCES 
 
Variable Definition Source 
Crisis Dummy variable that takes on the value one if a systemic crisis is observed or zero 
otherwise 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 
(2005) 
H-Statistic Variable that captures the competitiveness of the banking industry whereby H ≤ 0 
indicates monopoly equilibrium; 0 < H <1 indicates monopolistic competition and H = 
1 indicates perfect competition 
Claessens and Laeven (2004) 
Concentration Proportion of total assets held by the 3 largest institutions in a country, averaged over 
the period 1988–2003 
Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt, and Levine 
(2005a) and Bankscope 
Real GDP growth Rate of growth of the gross domestic product World Bank Development Indicators 
Real interest rate Nominal interest rate minus the rate of inflation International Financial Statistics 
Inflation Rate of change of the GDP deflator World Bank Development Indicators 
Terms of trade Change in the net barter terms of trade World Bank Development Indicators 
Depreciation Change in the foreign exchange rate International Financial Statistics 
M2/Reserves Ratio of M2 to gross foreign reserves World Bank Development Indicators 
Credit growth Rate of growth of domestic credit to the private sector, adjusted for inflation with GDP 
deflator 
International Financial Statistics 
Stock market total value 
traded/GDP 
Ratio of the value of total shares traded to average real market capitalization, the 
denominator is deflated. 
Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt, and Levine 
(2000)  
Moral hazard index Indicator that measures generosity of design features of deposit insurance schemes 
calculated as the first principal component of the following design features: co-
insurance, coverage of foreign currency and interbank deposits, membership, 
management, type and source of funding, level of explicit coverage and augmented for 
additional features regarding the presence of risk based premiums, deposit insurer’s 
power to revoke the bank licence and its ability to intervene a bank. 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 
(2002) and authors’ calculations 
British legal origin Dummy variable that takes on the value one if the country’s legal system is of British 
origin or zero otherwise 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer  (1998) 
French legal origin Dummy variable that takes on the value one if the country’s legal system is of French 
origin or zero otherwise 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer (1998) 
German legal origin Dummy variable that takes on the value one if the country’s legal system is of German 
origin or zero otherwise 
La Porta, , Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer (1998) 
Scandinavian legal origin Dummy variable that takes on the value one if the country’s legal system is of 
Scandinavian origin or zero otherwise 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer (1998) 
Activity restrictions Activity restrictions index for securities, insurance, real estate and ownership of 
nonfinancial firms that takes on values between 4 and 16, whereby greater values 
indicate more restrictions.  
Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004) 
Capital regulatory index Summary index for overall capital stringency calculated as the sum of initial capital 
stringency and overall capital stringency.  
Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004) 
Foreign ownership Proportion of bank assets owned by foreign entities.  Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001) 
Government ownership Proportion of bank assets owned by government La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer (2000) 
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